Categories: Utah Court Opinions

JENKINS v. PAYNE, 2002 UT App 129

Lynn Allan Jenkins, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Honorable A. Lynn Payne, Honorable David Young Payne, Utah State Bar, North Salt Lake City, Davis County, and Uintah County, Defendants and Appellees.

Case No. 20000956-CA.Utah Court of Appeals.
Filed April 25, 2002. (Not For Official Publication)

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

Appeal from the Second District, Farmington Department, The Honorable Rodney S. Page.

Lynn A. Jenkins, Bountiful, Appellant Pro Se.

Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee A. Lynn Payne.

Gerald E. Hess, Farmington, for Appellee Davis County.

Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Greenwood.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Appellant Lynn Allan Jenkins appeals the dismissal of his 1997 complaint filed in the Second District Court against the named Defendants.

Jenkins’s brief recites alleged facts relating to a real property dispute that is the subject of a separate lawsuit filed in the Eighth District Court for Uintah County (the Uintah County case). The complaint in this case sought orders directing (1) adjudication of the Uintah County case by a jury empaneled in the Second District Court for Davis County; (2) rescheduling of the trial in the Uintah County case; and (3) a jury trial in an unrelated case pending in North Salt Lake City Court before Judge David Young Payne. The Utah State Bar was dismissed by stipulation.

Jenkins sought an order compelling Davis County to empanel a jury to determine the facts relating to Jenkins’s claim to real property involved in the Uintah County case. Citing the statutory provisions governing responsibility for operation of the district courts, Davis County correctly asserts that the State of Utah has responsibility for operation of district courts and Davis County had no authority to empanel a jury as requested. Accordingly, there are no facts that could be proven to support the requested relief against Davis County and the complaint was property dismissed. There is no basis for an award of attorney fees to Jenkins.

The Second District Court dismissed the complaint against Judge A. Lynn Payne on grounds that (1) each of the acts complained of were performed in Judge Payne’s judicial capacity and the judge was entitled to absolute judicial immunity, and (2) the “law of the case” precludes the Second District Court from overturning the decision of the Eighth District Court. Although Jenkins makes the bare allegation that he seeks relief against Judge Payne in his individual capacity, this assertion is wholly unsupported in the record. The acts were clearly “judicial in nature,” involving rulings in the context of the ongoing judicial proceedings, and Jenkins has not disputed the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the case. See Christensen v. Ward, 916 F.2d 1462, 1473 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[I]mmunity attaches if 1) the acts complained of are judicial in nature; and 2) the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.”). The complaint was therefore properly dismissed. Because “one district court cannot overrule another district court judge of equal authority,” Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 946 (Utah 1987), the Second District Court could not schedule a Davis County jury trial in the Uintah County case, and the complaint was properly dismissed.

The court entered the default of Judge David Young Payne on the complaint seeking an order compelling a jury trial in a case then pending in the North Salt Lake City Court. However, the Second District Court correctly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to enter an order directing a justice court to schedule a jury trial in the absence of a timely appeal taken to district court at the culmination of the justice court proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (Supp. 2001). Notwithstanding the default of Judge David Young Payne, the district court had no authority to order the relief requested in the complaint. Jenkins has included no argument in his brief against the remaining county and municipal defendants. Accordingly, we do not consider any claims on appeal based upon Jenkins’s inadequate briefing. See, e.g., Inre C.Y., 834 P.2d 599 (Utah Ct.App. 1992).

We affirm the dismissal of the complaint.

Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding Judge, James Z. Davis, Judge, Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge.

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