706 P.2d 1050
No. 20625.Supreme Court of Utah.
August 28, 1985.
Petition for review from the Board of Review.
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Ralph C. Amott, Provo, for plaintiff.
K. Allan Zabel, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
PER CURIAM:
CMA, Inc. (CMA), employer of Julie A. Karr, seeks judicial review of a decision of the Board of Review reversing a decision of administrative law judge which denied Karr unemployment benefits on the ground that she had voluntarily left her employment without good cause. The Board ruled that Karr was discharged from her employment for actions which were not disqualifying under section 35-4-5(b)(1) of the Utah Employment Security Act and allowed benefits. The Board also denied CMA relief from charges pursuant to section 35-4-7(c)(3)(F)(1) of the Act. We affirm.
Karr was a collector for CMA and had been employed by them for a little over a year when her separation occurred. Two weeks prior to her discharge, Gerald Schepper, Karr’s supervisor, had called Karr and fellow collectors into his office and threatened them in abusive language that the collector with the lowest totals for the month would be fired at the end of the month. At the time the statement was made, Karr had the lowest collection totals. Four collectors, including Karr, complained to the owner of the business who promised to straighten the matter out. The following morning Schepper spoke to the collectors individually. He promised Karr not to threaten her with her job again and apologized for his behavior.
On Friday before her dismissal, Schepper informed Karr and other five minutes before closing time that they were staying late to move desks. It was Karr’s birthday, so she and another employee left at 5:00. Monday and Tuesday Karr, who was pregnant at the time, stayed home ill. On Wednesday, November 8, 1984, Karr called Schepper at 7:30 a.m. to tell him that she would not be at work at 8:00. Her father had just telephoned that her mother had possibly had a stroke, and Karr had to take her small son to their home instead of having him picked up. She arrived 45 minutes late and found her desk in such disarray that she had to straighten it out before she could perform her work properly. Around 11:00 Schepper called her in to tell her that she was doing a good job on the files, but then complained that she had taken up a lot of time cleaning her desk that morning. Karr pointed out to Schepper that she was unhappy with the way he had handled the desk-move the previous Friday. An angry exchange ensued with Schepper telling Karr she had an attitude problem and to straighten it out by November 30 or she was fired. Karr retorted, “Fire me now or quit threatening me with my job.” Schepper raised his voice and said, “Goodbye Julie.” Karr interpreted this to mean that she was fired, gathered her belongings, and told her good friend and co-worker that she had quit. She explained at the hearing that she was embarrassed at having lost her job, was upset and confused, and therefore made the facesaving remark. She never told Schepper that she was quitting, nor would she ever have left a job in that manner. She considered her job a life-supporting role and not a hobby, and could not afford financially to be without work. She called her husband, who in turn called Schepper who conceded that Karr could have interpreted his remark as a discharge and that “maybe she shouldn’t work.” When questioned on that point at the hearing Schepper responded, “If I wanted to fire her I probably would have said you’re fired right then. I was certainly in the mood to say something like that but I did not.” Schepper immediately sent Karr a blue slip showing that she had quit. This claim followed.
Whether an employee left work at her own volition or that of her employer, is
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a question of fact. Lanier v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 694 P.2d 625 (1985). CMA contends that the decision of the Board of Review was not reasonably supported by the evidence and was therefore unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. It also claims that the equities in this particular case provide a substantial ground for overturning the Board’s decision.
This Court will uphold the Board’s factual findings if supported by substantive evidence. Board of Education of Sevier County School District v. Board of Review, Utah, 701 P.2d 1064
(1985); accord Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, Utah, 658 P.2d 601 (1983); Salt Lake City Corporation v. Department of Employment Security, Utah, 657 P.2d 1312 (1982). In any judicial proceeding under section 35-4-10(i) of the Utah Employment Security Act, the findings of the Board of Review as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to questions of law. Chandler v. Department of Employment Security, Utah, 678 P.2d 315 (1984) (emphasis in original).
The administrative law judge found that the Department of Employment Security had properly denied unemployment insurance benefits and concluded that Karr misinterpreted Schepper’s remarks, and that she had the responsibility to assure herself that her interpretation of the remarks was correct. The Board of Review, in a two-to-one decision, found otherwise:
The General Rules of Adjudication generally require that a claimant seek clarification of a supervisor’s ambiguous statement implying dismissal. However, the record clearly shows that about two weeks prior to the claimant’s separation, the supervisor threatened to discharge the lowest producer in his unit by the end of the month. At that time, the claimant was the lowest producer in the unit. Thus, the evidence taken as a whole preponderates in favor of the claimant that she was in fact discharged by the employer for unsatisfactory performance. In the absence of culpability, unsatisfactory performance is not disqualifying under section 35-4-5(b)(1) of the Act. Because the claimant is not disqualified, the employer is not entitled to relief of charges pursuant to section 35-4-7(c)(3)(F) of the Act.
The Board of Review may on the basis of the evidence previously submitted in the case, or upon the basis of any additional evidence it requires, affirm, modify, or reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision of the appeal referee. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-4-10(d)(2) (supp. 1983); Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review, Utah, 568 P.2d 727, 729 (1977). The administrative law judge made his determination based on the isolated incident between Karr and Schepper and found that Karr had quit her employment. There was record evidence that could be interpreted that way. The Board of Review judged preceding episodes as well and found that Karr had been discharged by her employer. Those findings, supported by competent evidence, settle the question. The Board’s conclusion that consequently CMA was not entitled to relief of charges was correct.
The Board’s decision is affirmed.