ALLEN v. ALLEN, 2003 UT App 188


Donna M. Allen nka Donna M. Beck, Petitioner and Appellee, v. Bobby Ray Allen Jr., Respondent and Appellant. State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services, Intervenor.

Case No. 20020044-CA.Utah Court of Appeals.
Filed June 12, 2003. (Not For Official Publication)

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

Appeal from the Second District, Ogden Department, The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor.

Justin K. Roberts, Murray, for Appellant.

Donna M. Beck, Idaho Falls, Idaho, Appellee Pro Se.

Mark L. Shurtleff and Karma K. Dixon, Salt Lake City, for Intervenor.

Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Thorne.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:

Bobby Ray Allen, Jr. (Allen) appeals the district court’s order continuing child support payments. We affirm.

“Due to the equitable nature of child support proceedings, we accord substantial deference to the [district] court’s findings and give it considerable latitude in fashioning support orders.” Thornblad v.Thornblad, 849 P.2d 1197, 1198 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). Absent “an abuse of discretion,” “we will not disturb [the district court’s] actions.” Hillv. Hill, 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah Ct.App. 1992).

Upon reaching eighteen years of age, Bobby Allen III (Bobby) no longer qualified as a “child” under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2(6) (2002). Notwithstanding, Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-1 (2001) provides “that courts in divorce actions may order support to age 21.” Section 15-2-1 confers discretion on the district court to extend child support to age twenty-one, provided appropriate findings are made. See, e.g., Fletcherv. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1224 (Utah 1980); Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1978); Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d 864, 865
(Utah 1978). Findings of mental or physical disability are sufficient to warrant extension of child support beyond age eighteen. See Jackman v.Jackman, 696 P.2d 1191, 1192-93 (Utah 1985); Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah 1976). Moreover, this court has upheld orders extending child support until the anticipated date of high school graduation. See, e.g.,Thornblad, 849 P.2d at 1199.

Here, the district court made several detailed findings prior to ordering continuation of support payments for Bobby until June 30, 2003. The district court found Bobby’s “general cognitive ability was determined to be intellectually deficient, his verbal abilities were in the borderline range, and his general nonverbal abilities were in the intellectually deficient range.” Further, the district court found Bobby had been “diagnosed with a major depressive disorder, recurrent, severe with psychotic features and with post traumatic stress disorder.” The district court also found that Bobby was attending high school and that he anticipates graduating on June 30, 2003. These factual findings were sufficient to justify the district court’s order extending child support pursuant to section 15-2-1.

Accordingly, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the original decree to extend child support for Bobby until June 30, 2003, his anticipated date of high school graduation.

WE CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, Judge, and William A. Thorne Jr., Judge.